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A generous grant-in-aid furnished by the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) in the 
summer of 2014 enabled me to pursue research at the repository on the following 
questions. The first question is about the interaction of diverse medical cultures 
with the China Medical Board (CMB), a division of the Rockefeller Foundation 
(RF). When the CMB formally entered China in 1914, Western medicine had 
already come to the country through multiple channels. One significant pathway 
was for Chinese students to receive their training in Japanese medical schools, a 
pattern begun right after Japan defeated China in 1895. The returning Chinese 
medical doctors—who had been in some ways influenced by a German medical 
outlook in Japan—had already occupied important positions in the government 
medical administration and in various newly built national medical schools. The 
question I ask is, how did CMB personnel in the field deal with these students 
and their multiple foreign, but non-American, influences?  
The second question concerns the relationship between the medical students who 
had been trained earlier in Japan and those who had studied more recently in 
Western countries (mainly Great Britain and the United States). Although both 
groups were working towards establishing scientific medicine in China, they did 
not get along well. Japanese-trained Chinese doctors were initially in charge, and 
they tried to block the efforts of Western-trained Chinese doctors. In the late 
1920s, however, the latter gained the upper hand in the medical and public health 
administrative and educational institutions at both central and local levels. 
Beyond the political reasons for this development, I ask, how did the differences 
in medical science and in attention to public health between Japan and in the 
West affect this change?  
My third question is, simply, how did Rockefeller Foundation officials 
understand Japanese public health professional development?  
Probably because the Foundation had never formally entered Japan as a 
philanthropic organization, references to their Japanese public health-related 
projects were spread out in different collections at the RAC. I searched through 
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the records of the CMB (R4) and the Rockefeller Boards records (Series O), as 
well as the officers’ diaries (RG 12). Because some of these materials have been 
digitized and are available online, during my three-week research at the RAC, I 
limited my search to otherwise unavailable manuscript records.  
The research results I present here are organized chronologically into three parts, 
respectively covering Rockefeller Foundation officers’ views on Japanese medical 
education, on public health organization structure in Japan, and on the effort of 
visiting commissions and staff to understand how the prevailing Japanese 
background of many Chinese scientists might have an impact on medical 
students in China. The records also highlight the probably inevitable disparity in 
medical science and in public health practice in particular between the United 
States and Japan, as well as the Foundation’s changing viewpoint on the issue of 
whether Japan needed outside aid in order to adopt new advancements in the 
public health practices of the West.  
Starting in China: 1914–1915 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s China Medical Commission (CMC) traveled to 
China, the Philippines, and Japan in 1914 to investigate the development of 
medical schools, mission hospitals, and colleges and universities for the 
Rockefeller Foundation. The Commission published a formal report entitled 
Medicine in China.1 Archival sources about the CMC’s process of investigation in 
Japan are scattered across several collections at the RAC, but two files of notes do 
reveal commissioners’ views towards Japanese efforts at scientific medicine as it 
related to the work the CMC intended to undertake in China. These references 
also display commissioners’ anticipation of future conflict between the American 
medicine they would promote and the German-style medicine the Japanese had 
been practicing for about fifty years. 
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The first piece is Francis W. Peabody’s note of April 28, 1914, the tenth day after 
his arrival in Asia, documenting his visit to a Japanese hospital in Peking. He did 
not give the name of the hospital, but only indicated that it was one of “a series” 
operated by a Japanese society founded by Count Okuma for philanthropic work 
in China. Peabody pointed out that this facility was quite small, more like a 
dispensary than a hospital, and that the one Japanese doctor in residence there 
had studied the shorter Japanese medical course. The hospital’s businesslike 
appearance and its rather well-equipped laboratory nonetheless impressed him. 
Peabody specifically noted that this small facility performed the Wassermann 
reaction, a complicated test he had not seen in the other hospitals he had visited 
in Peking so far. He further commented that, in contrast with other Peking 
hospitals, the cleanliness, orderliness, and apparent efficiency of this one was 
striking. The language and tone of this short note clearly show that the author 
had respect for this Japanese medical facility.2  
Another file collected reports, memoranda, and notes the CMC members 
produced during their fall trip in 1914 to Japan, papers that supplement 
Peabody’s.3 The notes in the file listed, in the order of the date on which each note 
was written, the sites the CMC delegation visited. The notes reveal the 
commissioners calling at the Kyoto Prefectural Medical School and its hospital, at 
St. Luke’s International Hospital, the Imperial Institute for Infectious Diseases, 
and at the Medical School of the Imperial University of Tokyo and its hospital. In 
their notes and in a memorandum about the St. Luke’s International Hospital’s 
grant application, commissioners expressed clear feelings about the development 
of modern medicine in Japan and about how the problems derived from the 
situation in Japan could possibly affect future CMC work in China.  
Commissioners evaluated Japanese-trained Chinese medical students mainly 
through their comments on the prefectural medical schools. They observed that 
these were the same type of medical schools in which most of Chinese students 
had been educated in Japan. The best of these schools, they reported, was located 
in Osaka. The school at Kyoto stood second, while the school at Chiba was 
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deemed the poorest. Chinese students were accepted without examination at 
Chiba if they understood the language. They were not, however, given the same 
degrees as the Japanese, but instead took an examination and received a 
certificate. Graduates occasionally did well, but most, the reviewers thought, did 
not amount to much because their preparation had been so inferior. 
Commissioners expressed equally critical opinions about other Japanese medical 
facilities, and their comments showed concern about the possible need of the 
RF’s intervention on medical education. They noted that many professors in the 
Japanese medical schools were products of German laboratories and that 
Japanese medical education and hospital practice strictly followed German lines. 
The Japanese knew little of what was being done medically in the United States 
and showed little respect for it. Although they found the hospitals they visited 
sufficiently clean, orderly, and efficient, the commissioners judged the level of 
practice they witnessed to be far below current Western standards. 
Commissioners observed, moreover, that the Japanese, though well behind the 
West in modern medical practice, had the theoretical knowledge of scientific 
medicine and the economic power to catch up to it. The Commission decided, 
therefore, that medical work on a large scale in Japan was inadvisable because it 
would hurt the “amour-propre”—the pride—of the Japanese. 
The Commission did, however, strongly recommend a favorable consideration on 
St. Luke’s International Hospital’s grant request for a new building. Because the 
Rockefeller Foundation had previously committed itself to the meeting the 
overwhelming funding needs of the Belgium Relief during World War I, however, 
the funds were never granted. The memorandum by the Commission, written 
primarily by Roger S. Greene, exhibited the strategic concerns of the Foundation 
personnel in the field for their future work in China.  
Dr. Rudolf B. Teusler, an 1894 graduate of the Medical College of Virginia, had 
founded St. Luke’s in 1902 under the auspices of the Domestic and Foreign 
Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, and 
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served as its director and chief surgeon. One important reason for the 
Commission to support the Hospital was its superiority to other hospitals the 
Commission visited and its positive reputation among many Japanese medical 
men. Dr. Teusler and his medical staff, moreover, frequently invited leading 
Japanese physicians and surgeons as consultants to attend cases at the hospital. 
Developing this hospital further could make it an important vehicle for informing 
Japanese doctors of the development of medical science in the United States. 
With improvements, the hospital might serve as a contact zone between the 
American and Japanese medical professions.  
The Commission believed that because more Chinese had studied modern 
medicine in Japan than in any other country, the Japanese were likely to 
continue to have considerable influence on the development of medicine in 
China. Anything that would improve the standing of American medicine in 
Japan, therefore, would facilitate the China Medical Commission‘s relations with 
the Japanese-trained men in China who now occupied important positions in the 
Chinese government. Raising the standard of Japanese hospital practice would 
also indirectly help to improve the quality of future Chinese graduates of 
Japanese medical schools. In hopes of enabling the Foundation to exert its 
influence to raise the standard of Chinese doctors trained in Japan, the 
commissioners strongly recommended that the grant application be favorably 
considered.  
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Extending the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Interests beyond 
China: 1921–1923 
A key event in Rockefeller Foundation history in the period after World War I 
was John D. Rockefeller, Jr.’s 1921 “Oriental Trip” and his impressive delegation 
to China for the Peking Union Medical College’s dedication ceremony. This visit 
marked the Foundation’s increasing interest in the broader Far East. Officers 
conducted surveys on medical service and education in various countries. One 
report of interest is Dr. Richard M. Pearce’s “Medical Education in Japan (with 
Note on Hospitals and Public health).”4 
Dr. Pearce’s report covered a much wider subject than its title indicated. The 
parts that would most help scholars understand the Japanese medical education 
system and public health framework of the time are Dr. Pearce’s evaluation of 
Japanese medical schools and his description of the Japanese public health 
administrative organization.  
Dr. Pearce categorized Japanese medical schools into four groups: central 
government controlled university rank, non-university special schools, local 
government prefecture schools, and private schools. All totaled, the doctor 
counted twenty-five schools. Except for the four schools outside of Japan proper 
and two service schools, Pearce graded the other nineteen schools into four 
classes. His criteria roughly correlated with American standards, but he also took 
into consideration the management of the school, the number of students, how 
long it had been operating, and admission requirements. The A-plus class 
included the University Medical Schools of Tokyo, Kyoto, Kyushu, Kohoku, and 
Hokkaido, and a private one, the Medical College of Keio University. The A-
minus class included two prefectural government Medical Colleges, Osaka and 
Aichi. The grade B class included five imperial government special medical 
schools, Niigata, Kanazawa, Chiba, Okayama, and Nagasaki, two prefectural 
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government special Medical Schools, Kyoto and Kumamoto, and a private special 
school, Tokyo Charity Hospital Medical School; and class C included three private 
special Medical Schools: Nihon, Tokyo, and Tokyo Women’s. This classification is 
important for understanding the scientific status of Japanese-trained Chinese 
medical students. Another issue worth noting is that a government-required 
curriculum list revealed that hygiene was listed, but not public health or 
preventive medicine.  
According to Dr. Pearce, since1875 a public health administrative unit called the 
Central Sanitary Bureau had been operating as a part of the Ministry of the 
Interior (Home Affairs). This Bureau had three divisions: 1) a Health 
Preservation Section, responsible for supervising waterworks, sewage, street 
cleaning, parks, health resorts, food, and drinks; 2) an Epidemic Prevention 
Section, responsible for supervising the prevention of infectious and local 
diseases, quarantine work, vaccine lymph, sera, and vaccination; and 3) a 
Medical Affairs Section, responsible for supervising physicians, pharmacists, 
midwives, nurses, hospitals, and the handling of medicines. Personnel of this 
Bureau consisted of a councilor from the Home Department, and a staff of a 
director, sixteen subordinates, and four additional sanitary inspection experts. 
For the central government, the Institute of Infectious Disease did research work 
in connection with the prevention of epidemics, the preparation and distribution 
of vaccine lymph and various therapeutic sera, and a three month course for the 
training of physicians and veterinarians in the handling of infectious diseases.5 In 
major cities such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Yokohama, hygienic labs did routine 
examinations of water, air, soil, and food. At the time the most prevalent diseases 
were enteric fever, dysentery, diphtheria, smallpox, cholera, and verminosis. 
While the first governmental hygienic and public health organization in China 
was modeled after the Japanese system, Dr. Pearce’s description provides 
important references, and a comparison point for organizations of the later 
national health departments controlled by Chinese doctors trained in the West.  
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 Dr. Pearce’s observations on Chinese medical students trained in Japan did not 
add much that was new in comparison with what his colleagues had written in 
1914 and 1915. He claimed that, as a rule, these students were graduates of the 
poorer schools in Japan and that they normally came back  not with a diploma 
but rather merely a certificate as “listeners.” He also stressed again that Chinese 
students who had returned from Japan now controlled practically all 
governmental medical schools, such as national medical schools at Peking, 
Soochow, and Hangchow, and hospitals. Almost all of these facilities  were 
modeled after the Japanese-German system of medical education and 
administration. Dr. Pearce thought that the German medical system overstressed 
research and gave little concern to the human aspect of patient care. He predicted 
that this situation would cause problems for future graduates of the Peking Union 
Medical College when they were ready to seek jobs. 
One file at the RAC pertaining to a Dr. Tang Erho (1878–1940) seem to echo the 
worries that Dr. Pearce and of his colleagues were expressing.6 Tang probably 
belonged to the most pro-Japan Chinese student group trained in Japan. At the 
end stage of his life, he actually served as a high level official in the puppet regime 
in Beijing under Japanese rule. This might be the reason for difficulties in finding 
biographical information about him. Still, several facts became clear. Tang 
studied medicine in Kanazawa Medical School, (a class B school, according to Dr. 
Pearce), between 1907 and 1910 during his second time in overseas study in 
Japan. In the 1910s, he served as the president of the National Peking Medical 
School for several years. During this period, his most prominent contribution to 
spreading Western-style medicine was that he single-handedly pushed through a 
government decree on dissection in 1914 that legalized this practice in medical 
education in China. In the 1920s, Tang held high-level positions in education in 
the Beiyang government. During the period I studied, the CMB personnel 
contacted him and extended several invitations for him to visit the US. Tang, 
however, made excuses each time for not going.  
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In his lifetime of work for the development of scientific medicine in China, Dr. 
Tang said nothing about public health and preventive medicine. When Dr. Tang 
was working on legalizing dissection for medical education in China in 1914, an 
American-trained Chinese doctor, Yan Fuqing, who happened to have returned to 
China in 1910 as well, added preventive medicine to the curriculum of the 
Xiangya Medical School in Hunan, which was a product of the cooperation 
between American missionaries and local Chinese.7 These cases suggest that 
there were clear differences between the two systems regarding actual public 
health training. 
Dr. Pearce’s in-depth survey, however, did not concern the different situation in 
Japanese medical schools on public health education and the formation of a 
public health profession. Dr. Pearce believed that Japan had largely succeeded in 
adapting Western medicine, apart from some difficulties in adjusting Western 
practices to national habits and customs. He confirmed the recommendations his 
colleagues had made in 1914: for the development of fundamental principles in 
laboratory work, in clinical medicine, or in the promotion of public health, Japan 
did not need aid from outside.  
Documents at the RAC indicate that this understanding was changing.8 In 1922, 
at Dr. Teusler’s initiative, the Foundation began to think about inviting Japanese 
medical scientists to the US to observe Western advances in scientific medicine, 
with an emphasis on public health administrative practice. After about a year of 
back-and-forth correspondence, a commission of six members arrived in New 
York in March of 1923. According to a later, retrospective account, during their 
two-month visit, the Japanese “carefully took notes and descriptions of staining 
methods, technical procedures and new clinical tests, clinic-pathological 
demonstrations; public health work and broad conception of what hospital could 
mean in community; social attitude toward disease and cooperation between 
organizations as life insurance companies, city and federal authorities and private 
agencies.”9  
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Upon the delegation’s return to Japan, its leader, Mataro Nagayo, the head of 
Japan’s Institute of Infectious Disease, wrote to Dr. Pearce about how much the 
experience had influenced him. “What I have experienced personally in the States 
urges me in many respects to undertake all possible applications here in Japan, 
and have already set about on my part numbers of improvement in our ordinary 
administrations etc. Especially those admirable organizations in America on the 
part of Public Health service were most instructive to us and some of them should 
be appointed by us at once even in the present state of our country. I am sure that 
all doctors who have been in the States with me are of the same opinion with 
myself.”10 This message aroused high hopes among Foundation officers that 
public health practice would develop in Japan without further outside aid.11  
Getting Involved: 1923–1938 
The Great Kantō earthquake that struck Japan on September 1, 1923 provided an 
opportunity for the Rockefeller Foundation to get directly involved in the 
development of the public health profession in the country. Dr. Teusler again 
played a mediating role in drawing the Foundation’s attention to the need for 
recovering the medical educational and practical facilities damaged by the 
earthquake.12  
The earthquake having completely leveled Dr. Teusley’s St. Luke’s International 
Hospital, he appealed to the Rockefeller Foundation for funds to rebuild it. 
Unlike during World War I, however, the Foundation and its subdivisions had 
decided end further direct involvement in disaster relief. John D. Rockefeller Jr. 
himself, along with the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Foundation, 
contributed a total of $500,000 to the American Red Cross, amounting to one-
tenth of the total funds the organization collected from the United States for 
Tokyo earthquake relief. Despite its reluctance, the Rockefeller Foundation, too, 
would be persuaded to get involved. 
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When Dr. Teusley learned that the Foundation was considering extending its help 
for the reconstruction process but wanted a formal invitation from the Japanese 
government, he contacted his Japanese friends, some of whom were government 
officials, and worked out an official invitation for a Foundation commission to 
survey medical and public health conditions in Japan. In May 1924, a 
commission consisting of Drs. Frederick F. Russell, Victor G. Heiser, and John B. 
Grant came to Japan to conduct an investigation. The commission concluded that 
Japan’s bacteriologists were doing first-class work by worldwide standards. Yet 
their advanced bacteriological work was still failing to help lower the mortality 
rate to the level of countries that had been moving forward in public health 
measures. The Japanese had fallen behind in establishing graduate-level public 
health training, especially public health administration training. They did not 
have public health nurses. Although their governmental public health system had 
great potential, it was fragmented. It appeared Japan did need some help from 
the outside. 
The Rockefeller Foundation undertook three initiatives to try to remedy this 
situation, focusing particularly on the shortage of well-trained, modern public 
health administrative personnel. First, in hopes of increasing Japanese 
knowledge about American institutions and methods of medicine and public 
health, the Foundation began providing postgraduate fellowships to aid Japanese 
MDs to study in the United States through auspices of the International Health 
Board. This aid had actually started even before the 1924 RF investigation, but 
the Foundation began issuing these grants more routinely in its wake. It provided 
twenty-eight such fellowships between 1922 and 1938. 
The Foundation’s second initiative was to have its Division of Medical Education 
assist a private medical school, the Medical School of the Keio University, to 
establish a preventive medicine department (today the Center for Preventive 
Medicine of the Keio University School of Medicine). Why was the first 
independent preventive medicine educational facility in Japan undertaken at a 
private, rather than a public (or imperial) university? There were several reasons. 
R A C  R E S E A R C H  R E P O R T S  13 
 
First of all, the nature of Japanese medical education system made it difficult to 
introduce modern trends into imperial universities.13 The government had less 
strict control of the private universities. Second, the medical group at the Keio 
University was considered more aggressive in absorbing Western medical 
advances. Third, Dr. Yoshio Kusama of the Keio Medical School strongly desired 
separating the hygiene and parasitology from the existing departments of 
pathology and bacteriology in order to establish a preventive medicine 
department that resembled the American system. Taking these factors into 
consideration, the Rockefeller Foundation granted Keio University $175,000 
toward a new building. The new institute’s formally opened in 1929.  
The Foundation’s third post-1924 aim in Japan was to construct a Tokyo Institute 
of Public Health in cooperation with the Japanese government. This cooperative 
project proved a long haul. In November 1924 the Foundation decided support 
this project with a total contribution not to exceed $1,500,000 for the building 
plus $40,000 a year for three years to underwrite the Institution’s urban and 
rural demonstration units. Further negotiations, however, were hung up by the 
question of selecting the institute’s director. The Japanese government suggested 
Dr. Mataro Nagayo, but various groups opposed Dr. Nagayo for varying reasons. 
Two of these reasons would place the Foundation’s overall goals for the Far East 
in particular jeopardy. Dr. Nagayo happened to be the leader of the ultra-pro-
German group that exerted the kind of influence the Foundation’s medical 
program was in part directed toward overcoming. More than that, Dr. Nagayo 
also led a group that backed Japanese medical penetration of China, but for 
nationalistic rather than scientific purposes. There would be little chance, under 
his leadership, that the future institution could be utilized to help China develop 
its public health system. This tension, combined with a lack of local action, led 
the Foundation to withdraw its support in 1927.  
In April 1930, Dr. Miyajima, a member of both the Keio medical group and the 
Japanese Cabinet, met the Rockefeller Foundation’s Dr. Heiser in Geneva, where 
the two reopened the discussion of the possibility of cooperation toward the 
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construction of the Tokyo Institute of Public Health. The stated rationale was the 
promotion of good international relations and humanitarian service to the 
Japanese people. The Japanese government invited Dr. Heiser to come to Japan. 
His visit in November 1930 resulted in the organization of a special committee to 
study needs and conditions and to present a definite project. This committee was 
also responsible for making grounds and facilities available for construction, for 
presenting definite numbers for the cost of construction and equipment, for 
guaranteeing the government’s willingness to maintain the plant, and to make 
arrangements with the local government for demonstration units. The fact that 
many members of this committee had been International Health Board fellows 
may have facilitated this arrangement. 
Although the Japanese acted much more enthusiastically this time, other hurdles 
remained. First, it took about a year for the Japanese special committee to 
resolve the problem of selecting a district for experimental and practical work. It 
presented this project to the RF’s Board in October 1931. At this point, however, 
the Board decided to cut its financial gift to two-thirds of its 1924 offer in order to 
adjust for the impact of the worldwide depression on the Foundation’s liquidity. 
The project was further stalled when the League of Nations, in an effort to resolve 
the international fracas caused by the Manchurian Incident of September 6, 1931, 
strongly urged the Foundation to postpone.  
The project did not move forward until November 1933 with a push by Selskar 
Gunn. The road to construction, however, remained obstructed. This time, 
problems again arose in Japan. In the intensified post-Manchuria Incident 
nationalistic climate, the Japanese military expressed strong opposition to 
allowing the Foundation’s appointed representative, Dr. Charles N. Leach, to 
reside in Japan, where he was to supervise the construction and direct the urban 
and rural health center. Opposition to foreigners playing such roles in Tokyo 
came out most explicitly in the medical press.  
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Although Dr. Leach and his successor John B. Grant were forced to conduct their 
work with the Institute from a base in China, construction nonetheless proceeded, 
if slowly. In 1938, with the building close to completion, a rapid increase in the 
cost of materials delayed the work again. The Institute’s formal opening 
ceremony took place in 1940. Although the United States and Japan were not yet 
on an obvious war footing, the only American to attend the event was the 
secretary of the American ambassador attended.  
Conclusion 
The slow pace of the Rockefeller Foundation’s efforts to advance public health 
enterprise in Japan provides a very interesting case in terms of knowledge 
transfer and cultural exchange. Japan had been the first Asian country to 
industrialize and to be directly influenced by European practices. The Japanese 
government officially adopted the German medical approach as early as 1870. In 
1874, the Isei (medical code) decree launched the modern Japanese public health 
system. In 1893, a reformed central administration placed all public health-
related activities under police supervision, a practice that continued until 1942. 
These changes were all undertaken by the initiative of the Japanese themselves. 
Yet, despite the passage of many decades, a public health profession had not 
grown organically out of this environment of adopted Western medicine and 
industry. Instead, in the government-subsidized medical educational system, 
public health remained largely disconnected from medicine. The Japanese case 
thus becomes an interesting point of comparison with other Asian countries, such 
as China and the Philippines, which adopted Western public health practices in 
the 1920s and 1930s at a faster rate and with more evident results. Placed in 
political context, this material also helps explain why the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s prewar investments in Japan remained so limited.  
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